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 Following the accession to power 
of the Nazi party, the status of private 
enterprise was in considerable 
jeopardy. The Nazi party, for all 
practical purposes, had become the 
State. For it needed and gave orders 
to the State. It was the instrumentality 
for totalitarian control. There were 
not doubt influential circles within the 
party who had radical ideas with 
reference to big business or the 
"Gross Concerns" (of which) Farben 
was in the vulnerable position of 
being the outstanding target for any 
(prog) program that might be directed 
against private industry. (It) Farben 
decided, in this state of affairs, to cast 
 its lot with Hitler. It made huge 
contributions to the Nazi party. It 
sought Hitler's support for the 
synthetic gasoline program on 
which Farben had expended huge 
sums in research and development. 
[A program] The coming [program] 
program of autarchy, military 
economy and rearmament fitted in 
admirably with the abilities and 
plans of Farben for development 
[in] of the chemical industry. Farben 
was astute enough to see that it 
could do business with Hitler. 
 The defense has stressed the fact that 
the early stages of its activity 
[durin(g)] in collaboration with the 
German Reich in the period from the 
seizure of power up to the time of 
the 4 Year Plan was largely 
economic in character. It is no doubt 
true that it is exceedingly difficult to 
draw an exact line between those 
activities which were originally 
concieved as military measures and 
those which were initiated for the 
purpose of making Germany self 
supporting following 
 the world-wide economic depression 
of which gripped Germany in 1931. 
There were sound economic reasons 
why Germany, independently of the 
military factor, would want to be self 
sufficient by production of (synthe) 
synthetic oil, synthetic rubber, rayon, 
synthetic (fiber) fibers and other 
synthetic (raw) materials. (But such) 
By development of such products 
Germany might become self (suffic) 
supporting and scare foreign 
exchange necessary for the 
importation of such raw materials 
might be saved. 
 But any legitimate purposes (that 
were) originally present in the early 
stages of the program became 
rapidly merged with the 
predominant military 
considerations. (The predo) In the 
area of planning for war one does 
not (think) think in terms of costs. It 
is the victory that matters. No one 
knew this better than Hitler and (the 
party mountebank mountebank to) 
Goering. Normal economic laws 
were thrown into discord as 
Germany undertook its gigantic 
armament effort 
 (including and the) including the planning 
and production of raw materials on which 
such warlike enterprise must (necesasi) 
necessarily be based. Schacht saw the 
implications of the program. The end of 
the road was either war or economic (ruin 
re) ruin. His efforts to obtain limitation of 
the program for the economic reasons 
advanced were rejected so he left the 
program. Whether or not he, like Farben, 
would have remained with the program if 
he had continued to direct it is beside the 
point. The fact remains that intelligent 
people in Germany knew where the 
program was heading. 
But new economics of the German 
Reich meant much for Farben. (It 
meant) In addition to (the profit 
 (motive which must necess) such 
undoubtedly present factors as the 
profit motive and that going along 
(would) with the program of Hitler 
and Goering would preserve and 
expand the Farben empire, there was 
the genuine appeal (of such a 
program) to the scientific (and) 
inclinations of the technical leaders 
of Farben. Here (to develop) was the 
opportunity to (realize) achieve 
plans (which) for which there could 
be no practical realization under a 
normal peacetime economy. There 
(wer) were undoubtedly many other 
factors present. 
 but, regardless of motive or reason, 
Farben worked hand in hand with 
the rearmament effort, with such 
technical efficiency and competency 
that they came perilously close to 
making it possible for Hitler to foist 
permanently the cause of Nazi 
totalitarianism on a goodly part of 
the Western World. 
